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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Christopher Thomas appeals contending the district court erred when it denied 
his motion for time served The district court based its decision on the idea that credit is 
not properly awarded for discretionary time served as a condition of probation. 
However, the district court failed to take into account the recent amendments to the 
credit statutes. Those amendments provide that credit is to be given for periods of 
incarceration served as a condition of probation, and, by their plain language, they are 
retroactive in scope. 
As a result, this Court should reverse the district court's order denying the motion 
for credit and remand this case so that an order for the credit to which Mr. Thomas is 
entitled might be entered. To that point, the record and the documents Mr. Thomas 
presented in support of his motion demonstrate he is entitled to a total of 734 day of 
credit for time served. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Thomas filed a pro se motion requesting that the district court grant him 
"credit for all local, county and state time served in conjunction with this charge, and the 
resulting sentence imposed by the Court."1 (Augmentation - Motion.) In support of his 
motion, he offered his own affidavit which identified several periods of incarceration for 
1 Trial counsel had filed a generic motion requesting "an order correcting the amount of 
credit for time served in the above-entitled case," but there was no evidence presented 
with that motion nor were any clarifications made identifying which periods of time 
Mr. Thomas was seeking credit for. (R., p.134; see generally R.) As such, when that 
motion was denied (R., p.136), Mr. Thomas took it upon himself to file a complete 
motion for credit identifying the periods of time he felt were not being properly credited 
and he presented evidence in support of his claim. (See Augmentation - Motion; 
Augmentation - Affidavit (with documents attached thereto).) 
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which he was not receiving credit, as well as documents of his incarceration from the 
Ada County Sheriff - six jail booking sheets and one ree-page serving time history 
report and from the Idaho Department of Correction (hereinafter, !DOC) - an offender 
profile and an official time calculation report. (See generally Augmentation.) Those 
records reveal that Mr. Thomas was incarcerated during the following periods of time: 
March 1, 2010, through March 2, 2010 (Augmentation - Jail Booking Sheet); 
- August 9, 2010, through August 12, 2010 (Augmentation - IDOC Official Time 
Calculation Report); 
- August 12, 2010, through March 7, 2011 (Augmentation - IDOC Official Time 
Calculation Report); 
March 7, 2011, through December 3, 2011 (Augmentation - Serving Time 
History report, p.1 ); 
- April 17, 2012, through April 24, 2012 (Augmentation - Serving Time History 
report, p.2); and 
June 20, 2013, through January 27, 2014 (Augmentation - Jail Booking 
Sheet). 
The underlying record revealed one other period of presentence incarceration not 
reflected in the records Mr. Thomas presented. The minutes from the July 19, 2010, 
sentencing hearing indicate that Mr. Thomas was "remanded to custody" on that date so 
the presentence investigator could interview him. (R., p.45.) The minutes from the 
subsequent sentencing hearing on August 9, 2010, indicated that Mr. Thomas remained 
incarcerated at that time. (R., p.52.) 
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By Mr. Thomas' calculation, this amounted to a total of 727 days of time served, 
he was only receiving credit for 467 days of that time. 2 (Augmentation - Affidavit, 
see R., p.132 (order revoking probation ordering Mr. Thomas be given credit for 
467 days of time served).) As such, he requested the district court "re-calculate and re-
credit my time served" against his unified sentence of eight years, with three years 
fixed, for delivery and possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine.3 
(Augmentation - Affidavit, p.2, R., p.132 (order reducing the initially-imposed sentence 
upon revocation of probation).) 
The district court denied Mr. Thomas' pro se motion for credit on its merits 
because "[t]he Court does not give credit for jail time when it is a term of probation, or 
discretionary jail time." (Augmentation - Order.) For example, the period of 
incarceration from March 7, 2011, through December 3, 2011, was a period of local 
incarceration with a work release option served as a condition of Mr. Thomas' probation. 
(Augmentation - Serving Time History report, p.1; R., p.65 (setting forth the terms of 
Mr. Thomas' probation).) Similarly, the period of incarceration from April 17, 2012, 
through April 24, 2012, was served as discretionary jail time. (Augmentation - Serving 
Time History report, p.2.) 
2 For example, the district court had already clarified Mr. Thomas was receiving credit 
for his period of retained jurisdiction (August 11, 2010, through March 7, 2011 ), and so, 
denied Mr. Thomas' motion for credit for that particular term of incarceration. (R., p.71 
(hand-written notation).) 
3 The district court initially retained jurisdiction in Mr. Thomas' case. (R., p.56.) It 
subsequently suspended Mr. Thomas' sentence after he completed the rider program. 
(R., pp.64-67.) That period of probation was thereafter revoked, at which time, the 
district court reduced and executed Mr. Thomas' sentence. (R., pp.131-32.) 
3 
Mr. Thomas now appeals from that order denying his prose motion.4 
4 Mr. Thomas had filed a timely notice of appeal from the order denying counsel's 
generic motion for credit. ( See R., pp.136-41.) The Idaho Supreme Court suspended 
that appeal pending resolution of Mr. Thomas' subsequently-filed prose motion. (Order 
Suspending Briefing Schedule, dated August 11, 2015.) The Supreme Court thereafter 
granted Mr. Thomas' motion to augment the appellate record in this case with all the 
documents relevant to his pro se motion for credit for time served. (Order Granting 
Motion to Augment and Resume Briefing Schedule, dated August 28, 2015.) 
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ISSUE 
Whether the district erred by denying Mr. Thomas' motion for credit for time 
5 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Thomas' Motion For Credit For Time Served 
A The Amendments To The Credit Statutes Allowing For Credit For Time Served 
As A Condition Of Probation Are Retroactive, And So, Control In Mr. Thomas' 
Case 
The district court denied Mr. Thomas' motion for credit because "[t]he Court does 
not give credit for jail time when it is a term of probation, or discretionary jail time." 
(Augmentation - Order.) However, the Legislature recently amended the credit statutes 
(I.C. §§ 18-309 and 19-2603) to provide precisely the opposite. As amended, I.C. § 18-
309(2) provides: 
In computing the term of imprisonment when judgment has been withheld 
and is later entered or sentence has been suspended and is later 
imposed, the person against whom the judgment is entered or imposed 
shall receive credit in the judgment for any period of incarceration 
served as a condition of probation under the original withheld or 
suspended judgment 
(emphasis added). Similarly, LC.§ 19-2603, as amended, provides: 
When the court finds that the defendant has violated the terms and 
conditions of probation, it may, if judgment has been withheld, pronounce 
any judgment which it could originally have pronounced, or, if judgment 
was originally pronounced but suspended, revoke probation The time 
such person shall have been at large under such suspended sentence 
shall not be counted as a part of the term of his sentence. The defendant 
shall receive credit for time served from the date of service of a bench 
warrant issued by the court after a finding of probable cause to believe the 
defendant has violated a condition of probation, for any time served 
following an arrest of the defendant pursuant to section 20-227, Idaho 
Code, and for any time served as a condition of probation under the 
withheld judgment or suspended sentence. 
(emphasis added). These amendments also superseded the Idaho Supreme Court's 
decision in State v. Banks, which held that defendants were not entitled to credit for time 
served as a condition of their probation. See State v. Banks, 121 Idaho 608 (1992). 
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"In general, legislation acts prospectively." Guzman v. Piercy, 155 Idaho 928, 
(2014). However, there are some cases where a new piece of legislation or an 
amendment to an existing statute will be retroactive in effect. See, e.g., id. at 938 
(specifically considering an amendment to an existing statute to have retroactive effect). 
As the Idaho Supreme Court explained, "'a statute should be applied retroactively only if 
the legislature has clearly expressed that intent or such intent is clearly implied by the 
language of the statute."' Id. (quoting Kent v. Idaho Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 93 Idaho 618, 
621 (1970); cf Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'/ Med. Ctr, 151 Idaho 889, 893 (2011) 
(holding that courts are to give effect to the plain language of the statute when the 
statute is unambiguous). 
For example, the Guzman Court explained, '"if the language clearly refers to the 
past as well as the future, then the intent to make the law retroactive is expressly 
declared within the meaning of [the statute]."' Guzman, 155 Idaho at 938 (quoting 
Peavy v. Mccombs, 26 Idaho 143, 151 (1914)) (bracketed text amended). As such, an 
amendment to a statute which provided, "'[w]henever any ... herd district . . . has 
heretofore been, or shall hereafter be, declared to be created ... by an order,' '[n]o 
challenge to ... such an order, shall be heard or considered after seven (7) years has 
lapsed from the date of the order,"' clearly expressed the legislative intent for that 
amendment to be retroactive in scope. Guzman, 155 Idaho at 938 (quoting I.C. § 31-
857) (ellipses from original). The reason was "[t]his language referencing 'any' order 
that 'has heretofore been, or shall hereafter be'" referred to both past and future events, 
thus making that portion of the statute retroactive. Id. (emphasis added). 
Similarly, the Idaho Supreme Court held that statutory language providing: 
"'[T]he administration of all rights to the use of ground water, whenever or however 
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acquired or to be acquired, shall, unless specifically excepted therefrom, be governed 
the provisions of this act,'" also made the statute retroactive in scope "by the express 
language in [that section] of the original act." A & B Irr. Dist. v. Idaho Dept. of Water 
Resources, 153 Idaho 500, 508 (2012) (quoting 1951 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 200). As 
in Guzman, it was the inclusion of "all rights ... whenever or however acquired or to be 
acquired," thus referring to past and future events, which demonstrated the intent for the 
statute to be retroactive. See id. (emphasis added). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has also applied this rule to statutory amendments 
which alter the consequences of a criminal conviction. See State v. Forbes, 152 Idaho 
849, 851 (2012) (considering whether an amendment to the sex offender registration act 
was retroactive). In Forbes, the Supreme Court determined the statutory amendment 
had retroactive effect because "the Legislature, by implication, intended the amendment 
to apply to offenders who have already been granted a withheld judgment," even though 
the relevant code section also provided "'[n]o part of these comp[il]ed laws is retroactive 
unless expressly so declared."' Id. (quoting I.C. § 73-101 ). Specifically, the amendment 
provided: '"A judgment of conviction for a violation of any offense requiring sex offender 
registration as set forth in section 18-8304, Idaho Code, shall not be subject to dismissal 
or reduction under this section."'5 Id. (quoting 2006 Idaho Sess. Laws Ch. 157). As in 
Guzman and A & B Irr. Dist., it was the language "for any offense" which expressly 
declared the intent for that amendment to be retroactive. 6 See id. (emphasis added); 
5 The amendment continued, but only to provide that "[a] conviction for the purposes of 
this chapter means that the person has pied guilty or has been found guilty, 
notwithstanding the form of the judgment or withheld judgment." See 2006 Idaho Sess. 
Laws Ch. 157. 
6 That conclusion was bolstered by the fact that the Court had already determined this 
amendment did not violate the protections against ex post facto laws. Forbes, 152 
Idaho at 851 (citing State v. Hardwick, 150 Idaho 580, 581-82 (2011 )). 
8 
cf Tugade v. Hoy, 265 F.2d 63, 65 (9th Cir. 1959) (holding "[t]he statute, § 241 (a)(11) 
as amended, 70 Stat. 575 (1956), by its terms is specifically made retroactive to one 
'who at any time has been convicted of . any law ... relating to the illicit possession 
of. narcotic drugs .... "') (ellipses from original, emphasis added). As such, it did not 
matter when the judgment was entered; the amendment's effect was still made 
retroactive by the statutory language, and so, would impact on cases in which the 
judgment had already been entered. See Forbes, 152 Idaho at 851. 
Like the statutory amendment at issue in Forbes, as well as the statutes at issue 
in Guzman and A & B Irr. Dist., the language of the 2015 amendments to the credit 
statutes expresses a clear intent for those amendments to be retroactive in scope: 
In computing the term of imprisonment when judgment has been withheld 
and is later entered or sentence has been suspended and is later 
imposed, the person against whom the judgment is entered or imposed 
shall receive credit in the judgment for any period of incarceration served 
as a condition of probation under the original withheld or suspended 
judgment. 
The defendant shall receive credit for time served from the date of service 
of a bench warrant issued by the court after a finding of probable cause to 
believe the defendant has violated a condition of probation, for any time 
served following an arrest of the defendant pursuant to section 20-227, 
Idaho Code, and for any time served as a condition of probation under 
the withheld judgment or suspended sentence. 
2015 Idaho Sess. Laws Ch. 99 (amending I.C. §§ 18-309 and 19-2603 respectively) 
(emphasis added). Just "[a]s the GWA[7] governs all water rights whenever acquired, 
[and] I.C. § 31-857 governs all herd district ordinances whenever enacted," the 
amendments to I.C. §§ 18-309 and 19-2603 govern all periods of incarceration served 
as conditions of release on probation, whenever enforced. Guzman, 155 Idaho at 938; 
7 The Ground Water Act, which was at issue in A & B Irr. Dist. 
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compare also Forbes, 152 Idaho at 851 (holding the amendment to the sex offender 
registration act governs all judgments of conviction for sex offenses, whenever entered) 
Thus, by using the term "any," thereby referring to past and future periods of 
incarceration served as a condition of release on probation, the language of the 2015 
amendments to the credit statutes expressly declared that those amendments were 
retroactive in scope. And, as in Forbes, that language also demonstrates that the time 
the judgment was entered is irrelevant to the operation of the amended statutes. 
Compare Forbes, 152 Idaho at 851. As a result, the 2015 amendments control the 
credit calculation in Mr. Thomas' case. 
B. Mr. Thomas Presented Sufficient Evidence To Show The Credit Calculation In 
His Case Was Erroneously Low 
Mr. Thomas requested that the district court grant him "credit for all local, county 
and state time served in conjunction with this charge, and the resulting sentence 
imposed by the Court." (Augmentation - Motion.) The records he presented in support 
of that motion identify 714 days during which Mr. Thomas was incarcerated on this 
case: 
- A term of 2 days from March 1, 2010, through March 2, 2010 (Augmentation -
Jail Booking Sheet), following his initial arrest in this case (see R., pp.9-10 
(complaint filed March 2, 201 O); 
- A term of 4 days from August 9, 2010, through August 12, 2010 
(Augmentation - IDOC Official time Calculation Report), between the 
sentencing hearing and official placement in an !DOC facility (see R., p.56 
Uudgment of conviction ordering Mr. Thomas' commitment as of August 9, 
2010); 
10 
- A term of 207 days8 from August 12, 2010, through March 7, 2011 
(Augmentation IDOC Official Time Calculation Report), while Mr. Thomas 
was serving a period of retained jurisdiction (see R., p.63 (minutes from the 
rider review hearing held on March 7, 2011); 
- A term of 271 days9 from March 7, 2011, through December 3, 2011 
(Augmentation - Serving Time History report, p.1 ), while Mr. Thomas served 
a period of work release as a term of his probation (see R., p.65 (setting the 
terms of Mr. Thomas' probation): 
- A term of 8 days from April 17, 2012, through April 24, 2012 (Augmentation -
Serving Time History report, p.2), while Mr. Thomas served a period of 
discretionary jail time (see R , p.65 (authorizing discretionary time as a term 
of Mr. Thomas' probation); and 
- A term of 222 days from June 20, 2013, through January 27, 2014 
(Augmentation Jail Booking Sheet), between his arrest and the ultimate 
disposition on an allegation of probation violation (see R., p.83 (agent's 
warrant served on June 20, 2013); R., p.130 (minutes of disposition hearing 
held on January 27, 2014). 
Additionally, the appellate record reveals that Mr. Thomas was incarcerated for a 
term of 21 days10 from July 19, 2010, through August 9. 2010. The minutes from the 
July 19, 2010, sentencing hearing indicate that Mr. Thomas was "remanded to custody" 
8 One day is removed from this term calculation so August 12, 2010, is not double 
counted. 
9 One day is removed from this term calculation so March 7, 2011, is not double 
counted. 
10 One day is removed from this term calculation so August 9, 2010, is not double 
counted. 
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so that the presentence investigator could interview him (R., p.45.) The minutes from 
subsequent sentencing hearing indicate Mr. Thomas remained in custody as of 
August 2010. (R., p.52.) That brings the total time for which Mr. Thomas should be 
receiving credit to 734 days. 
Mr. Thomas recognizes that he only calculated, and thus, only specifically 
requested credit for a total of 727 days of incarceration. (Augmentation - Affidavit, p.2.) 
However, his motion was for credit for all the time to which he is entitled, and that would 
include all the periods of incarceration discussed infra. (See Augmentation - Motion.) 
Ultimately, though, "a district court may only give credit for the correct amount of time 
actually served by the defendant prior to imposition of judgment; the district court does 
not have discretion to award credit for time served that is either more or less than that." 
State v. Moore, 156 Idaho 17, 21 (Ct. App 2014). Therefore, the fact that Mr. Thomas 
may have miscalculated the total number of days to which he is entitled credit should 
not preclude the courts from properly calculating and subsequently ordering credit for 
the time he was actually incarcerated. 
Thus, the record shows Mr. Thomas served 734 days of incarceration prior to the 
order revoking his probation and executing his sentence. Under the retroactive 2015 
amendments to the credit statutes, Mr. Thomas is entitled to credit against his sentence 
for all that time actually served on this case. However, he is only receiving credit for 
467 days. (Augmentation - Affidavit, p.2; R., p.132.) Since the district court's decision 
to deny Mr. Thomas' motion to correct that error on a rationale superseded by the 




Mr. Thomas respectfully requests this Court reverse the order denying his motion 
credit for time served and remand this case for entry of an order for all the credit to 
which he is entitled. 
DATED this 1st day of October, 2015. 
4,,1~ 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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